Abstract. Since 1981, the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has dominated studies of non-kin cooperation. Alternative models have received relatively little attention. The simplest alternative is mutualism, in which mutual cooperation always pays best. The behaviour of three pairs of blue jays, Cyanocitta cristata, was tested in precisely controlled iterated mutualism and Prisoner's Dilemma games. Although the jays readily cooperated in the mutualism game, cooperation neither developed nor persisted in a Prisoner's Dilemma. No empirical justification was found for the status of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as the basic paradigm of non-kin cooperation.
In 1950, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher of the RAND corporation challenged John Nash's concept of strategic equilibrium by presenting a simple 'non-cooperative' game. This game became known as the Prisoner's Dilemma based on a scenario presented by Albert Tucker (Poundstone 1992). In 1981, Axelrod & Hamilton argued that the Prisoner's Dilemma was a generally useful paradigm for the study of cooperation between unrelated animals. The Prisoner's Dilemma has since dominated both theoretical and empirical studies of non-kin cooperation (Lombardo 1985; Boyd & Lorberbaum 1987; Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988; Boyd 1989; Nowak 1990; Nowak & Sigmund 1992 , 1993 . Recently, however, some have argued that the Prisoner's Dilemma is only one of several alternatives to consider (Noë 1990; Dugatkin et al. 1992; Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1992) .
The Prisoner's Dilemma has motivated some clever studies of animal strategic behaviour (Gardner et al. 1984; Lombardo 1985; Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988) , although all empirical studies that claim to provide evidence of non-kin cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma suffer two deficiencies. First, no study has verified, through measurement or experimental control, that the payoffs governing the reported behaviour conform to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Second, no study has explicitly considered alternative models of non-kin cooperation. Our study addresses both of these deficiencies.
The Alternatives
Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin (1992) framed a basic model of animal cooperation in terms of a two-player game whose general characteristics are given by the matrix
During any play of the game, each player may cooperate (C) or defect (D), to receive a payoff that is based on both its own choice (the rows of the matrix) and its opponent's choice (the columns). Thus, if both players cooperate, both receive R units of payoff. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator receives S and the defector T. If both defect, both receive P. Following Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin (1992), we define cooperation in terms of its economic consequences, not in terms of social interaction: mutual cooperation is a joint action for mutual benefit. This definition has two mathematical components. First, R>P so that if both players deviate from mutual C, both do worse. Second, R>min (S,T) so that if one player deviates from mutual C, at least one player does worse.
This approach can describe four distinct cooperative situations, each defined by the two inequalities above, plus two unique inequalities. If R>T and S>P, as in the matrix 0003-3472/95/080527+09 $12.00/0 1995 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour
